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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
John Thomas Rainey appeals, pro se, from the judgment entered upon
the district court's orders denying counsel and summarily dismissing his
successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
After Rainey pied guilty to sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or
seventeen years of age, the district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with
25 years fixed. State v. Rainey. Docket No. 35774, 2010 Unpublished Opinion
No. 557, p.1 (Idaho App., July 22, 2010). The conviction and sentence were
affirmed on appeal.

~

at 1-6.

Rainey filed a timely pro se post-conviction petition alleging numerous
ineffective assistance of counsel claims but, aside from his own conclusory
affidavit, he did not support any of the claims with evidence. (R., pp.34-35, 4445, 72-73; #38151 R., pp.3-10. 1) The district court denied his motion for the
appointment of counsel and ultimately dismissed the petition. (R., pp.35, 45, 73;
#38151 R., pp.22-58, 68-88.) Rainey appealed (R., pp.35, 45, 73; #38151 R.,
pp.89-92) but subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which the Idaho

1

The state is, contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, filing a motion
requesting the Idaho Supreme Court to take judicial notice of the clerk's record
and transcripts prepared in Rainey's direct appeal from his underlying criminal
conviction, State v. Rainey, S.Ct. Docket No. 35774, and in his appeal from the
denial of his first post-conviction petition, Rainey v. State, S.Ct. Docket No.
38151.

1

Supreme Court granted on June 1, 2011 (#38151 Order Granting Motion To
Dismiss, entered June 1, 2011 ).
On April 26, 2012, Rainey, again acting pro se, filed a successive petition
for post-conviction relief, reasserting the ineffective assistance of counsel claims
he alleged in his original petition and also alleging that bis sentence constituted
cruel and unusual punishment and was imposed without regard for the
presentence investigator's recommendations, and that the district court violated
his Sixth Amendment rights by denying his request for the appointment of
counsel in his first post-conviction action. (R., pp.4-14.) The district court denied
Rainey's request for the appointment of counsel to pursue the successive
petition, ruling that Rainey failed to present facts to raise even the possibility of a
valid claim. (R., pp.34-41.) The state moved to dismiss the successive petition
for the reasons set forth in the court's order denying Rainey's request for the
appointment of counsel. (R., pp.42-43.) Thereafter, the court entered an order
conditionally dismissing the successive petition but giving Rainey 20 days to file
a response.

(R., pp.44-51.)

Rainey filed a motion for reconsideration of the

denial of his request for appointed counsel but did not specifically respond to the
court's order of conditional dismissal. (R., pp.52-55.) The district court denied
the motion for reconsideration and entered an order finally dismissing the
successive petition.

(R., pp.52, 72-79.)

The court entered a judgment of

dismissal on June 26, 2012 (R., pp.80-81), from which Rainey timely appealed
(R., pp.82-85).

2

ISSUE
Rainey's issue statement is set forth at pages 5-6 of his Appellant's brief
and, due to its length, is not repeated here. The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Rainey failed to show error in the district court's orders summarily
dismissing his successive post-conviction petition and denying his request for
counsel?

3

ARGUMENT
Rainey Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Orders Denying His
Request For Counsel And Summarily Dismissing His Successive PostConviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Rainey challenges the district court's orders denying his request for

counsel and summarily dismissing his successive post-conviction petition. (See
generally Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.)

With the exception of his claim that the

district court erred by denying his requests for post-conviction counsel, Rainey
has not identified any specific error by the district court and has not supported
his appellate claims with any cogent argument or citation to legal authority; the
claims are therefore waived and should not be considered by this Court on
appeal. Alternatively, Rainey has failed to establish that the district court erred in
denying his request for counsel and summarily dismissing his successive
petition.

B.

This Court Should Decline To Consider Those Appellate Claims That Are
Unsupported By Either Argument Or Authority
"When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law,

authority, or argument, they will not be considered." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996).

It is also well settled that the appellate

court will not review actions of the district court for which no error has been
assigned and will not otherwise search the record for errors. State v. Hoisington,
104 Idaho 153,159,657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983).

4

On appeal, Rainey has reiterated the claims in his successive postconviction petition but, with the exception of his claim that the district court erred
by declining to appoint post-conviction counsel, he has not identified any specific
error by the district court, has offered virtually no argument and has cited no
legal authority.

(See Appellant's brief, pp.7-14)

Given the lack of any

meaningful argument and the complete absence of any citation to authority, this
Court should decline to consider the merits of Rainey's unsupported claims.

C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Rainey's Request For Counsel And
Dismissed His Successive Petition Because The Allegations In The
Petition Did Not Raise The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
Even if this Court considers the merits of Rainey's appellate claims, he

has failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court's orders denying his
request for counsel and summarily dismissing his successive petition because,
as the district court correctly concluded, the allegations in the successive petition
failed to raise even the possibility of a valid claim, much less present an issue of
material fact entitling Rainey to an evidentiary hearing.

2

A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is
governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-

2

A post-conviction claim is properly dismissed if the petitioner fails to present
evidence sufficient to show a material issue of fact on which relief can be
granted. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522-23, 164 P.3d 798, 802-03
(2007). Because this is a higher burden than demonstrating the possibility of a
valid claim necessitating the appointment of counsel, Judd v. State, 148 Idaho
22, 24,218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009), Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339,345,223
P.3d 281, 287 (Ct. App. 2009), the state will focus on the "possibility of a valid
claim" standard on the assumption that if Rainey did not show entitlement to
counsel the dismissal of his claims is proper, but that if he did show entitlement
to counsel then dismissal without the opportunity of counsel to appear was error.
5

appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v.
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147
Idaho 682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). The court's discretion is not
unfettered, however.

If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts

showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112.
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with
the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164
P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust, 147 Idaho at 684, 214 P.3d at 670.
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot
be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau,
140 Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion
for appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not
set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to

6

questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001 ), quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792,
102 P. 3d at 1111.
In denying Rainey's request for counsel and dismissing his successive
post-conviction petition, the district court thoroughly evaluated all of Rainey's
claims and supporting evidence and correctly determined, based upon the
applicable legal standards and its review of the underlying criminal and initial
post-conviction records, that Rainey failed to set forth adequate facts to raise
even the possibility of a valid claim, much less present a genuine issue of
material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any of the claims in his
successive petition. (See R., pp.34-41, 44-51, 72-79.) The state adopts as its
argument on appeal the district court's analyses, as set forth in its May 9, 2012
Order Denying Appointment Of Counsel, its May 22, 2012 Order Conditionally
Dismissing Successive Petition, and its June 26, 2012 Order Dismissing
Successive Petition. For this Court's convenience, copies of the district court's
orders are appended to this brief. (See Appendices A - C.)
With the exception of his claim that the district court erred in denying his
requests for post-conviction counsel, Rainey does not specifically challenge any
of the court's findings or legal conclusions. (See generally Appellant's brief.) As
to the denial of counsel claim, Rainey relies on Martinez v. Ryan, _

U.S. _ ,

132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), for the proposition that the district court, having denied
Rainey's request for counsel in his first post-conviction proceeding, was required
to appoint counsel in the successive post-conviction proceeding, apparently

7

without regard for the potential viability, or lack thereof, of any of the claims
raised in the successive petition.

(See Appellant's brief, pp.2-3, 10-11.)

Rainey's reliance on Martinez for this proposition is wholly misplaced.

In

Martinez, the Supreme Court held, "Where, under state law, claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral
proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing
a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review
collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was
ineffective." 132 S.Ct. at 1320 (emphasis added). This is an equitable principle
that applies a "narrow exception" to the "unqualified statement" in Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991 ), ''That an attorney's ignorance or inadvertence
in a post-conviction proceeding does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural
default" in a federal habeas proceeding; it does not provide a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.
1315.

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at

Rainey has failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court's

orders denying counsel and dismissing his successive post-conviction petition.

8

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the
court's orders denying counsel and summarily dismissing Rainey's successive
post-conviction petition.
DATED this

ih day of January 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ih day of January 2013, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
John Thomas Rainey
IDOC #90457
I.C.C., Q10C
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707

I A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney Gen
LAF/pm
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D I ~ ~ y
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

1

2
3

JOHN THOMAS RAINEY,

4

Petitioner,

5

6

Case No. CV-PC-2012-07699
ORDER DENYING
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

7

Defendant.
8

9

10

On April 26, 2012, the Petitioner, John Thomas Rainey, filed a Successive Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief, alleging his sentence amounted to cruel and inhuman punishment and
disregarded the presentence investigator's recommendations. He also complains that in his appeal

11

of his last post-conviction case, the Court violated his rights by not appointing counsel on appeal
12

from the Court's decision denying his first post-conviction Petition. Further he again contends that

13

his trial attorney failed to tell him that statements made during his psychological evaluation and

14

pre-sentence report could be used against him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to

15

participate. He further contends that his attorney should have sat in on both examinations with

16

him. He also contends that his attorney failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his
"somnambulism" after being instructed to do so. He claims his attorney forced him to answer a

17

questionnaire to please the Court and that his attorney promised him a certain sentence. Like

18

before, he did not support any of these statements with any other affidavits or evidence.

19

Furthermore, as discussed below, these are the same claims he made in his original Petition

20

simply repackaged.

21

some

In his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed on August 9, 2010, Rainey alleged
ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, claiming his attorney failed to tell him that

22

statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report could be used against
23

him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further contended that his

24

attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended that his attorney

25

failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after being instructed

26
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to do so. Like his Successive Petition, he did not support any of these statements with any other
1

affidavits or evidence. Furthermore, as the Court found in addressing this original Petition, his
2

factual allegations were not supported by the record. The Court denied him counsel at public

3

expense and ultimately entered judgment dismissing the Petition. He appealed. On appeal, the

4

Court denied him counsel and ultimately, the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal on June 6,

5

2011.
The Court takes judicial notice of the underlying record, including the guilty plea taken on

6

July 25, 2008, the sentencing held on October 8, 2008, and the LC. § 19-2522 psychological
7

evaluation. The Court also takes judicial notice of the record on his prior Petition for Post8

Conviction Relief, Case No. CV-PC-2010-15707.

9

Once again, in this Successive Petition, the record demonstrates that he was clearly

10

informed by his attorney and the Court about his constitutional right to remain silent and,

11

moreover, he acknowledged in the record that he had been informed. In addition, as the Court

12

found in his first Petition, he has no right to counsel during these evaluations. Based on the
documents in the file, in an exercise of discretion, the Court again finds Rainey is not entitled to

13

appointment of counsel at public expense because, like before, taking every inference in his favor,
14

he fails to allege facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim on a Successive Petition. The Court

15

finds that all of the claims alleged in the Successive Petition are frivolous. By this decision, the

16

Court is providing Rainey sufficient notice regarding the basis for its ruling to enable him to

17

provide additional facts, if they exist, to demonstrate the existence of a non-frivolous claim.
ANALYSIS

18

Rainey's request for appointment of counsel for this Successive Petition is governed by
19

LC. § 19-4904. 1 In an action for post-conviction relief, applicants do not have a constitutional right

20

to counsel. Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 160 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2007). A petitioner is not

21

entitled to appointment of counsel at public expense if he fails to allege facts that raise the

22

possibility of a valid claim. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 218 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2009); I.C. § 19-

23
24
25

1

I.C. § 19-4904. If the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of representation, including stenographic,
printing, witness fees and expenses, and legal services, these costs and expenses, and a court-appointed attorney may
be made available to the applicant in the preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal, and paid, on
order of the district court, by the county in which the application is filed.
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4904. In making that determination, the Court takes all inferences in the petitioner's favor. Id. at
1

792, 102 P.3d at 1111; Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676,679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001). If the Court
2

den'ies the motion for appointment of counsel, the Court must also provide the petitioner with

3

sufficient notice regarding the basis for its ruling to enable him to provide additional facts, if they

4

exist, to demonstrate the existence of a non-frivolous claim. Id.; Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,

5

653-54, 152 P.3d 12, 15-16 (2007).
The petitioner must first establish need. See LC. § I9-854(b). The Court finds that Rainey

6

has met the requirement. However, his claims in his Successive Petition are frivolous and he is not
7

entitled to relief.
8

Successive post-conviction applications are prohibited by LC. § 19A908 2 "where the

9

petitioner 'knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' waived the grounds for which he now seeks

10

relief, or offers no 'sufficient reason' for the omission of those grounds in his 'original,

11

supplemental or amended petition."' Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 955, 957

12

( 1981) (emphasis added); see also, Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P .2d 789, 793 (Ct.
App. 1999). The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is designed to address

13

collateral attacks upon allegedly improper convictions and sentences, not collateral attacks upon

14

other post-conviction proceedings. See Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct.

15

App. 1987). "[T]he ultimate focus of the proceeding would remain, as it should, on whether the

16

second application has raised not merely a question of post-conviction counsel's performance but

17

substantive grounds for relief from the conviction and sentence." Wolfe, 113 Idaho at 339, 743
P.2d at 992; See Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006). A

18

successive petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed if the grounds for relief
19
20

were finally adjudicated or waived in the previous post-conviction proceeding. LC. § 19-4908.
Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441-442, 128 P.3d 975, 978-979 (Ct. App. 2006).

21
22

23
24
25

2

J.C. § 19-4908. "All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original,
supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the
applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground
for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental,
or amended application."
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The Court, therefore, must determine whether the new claims were finally adjudicated in
1

the first proceeding or whether there was "sufficient reason" for Rainey to have omitted these
2

"new grounds." In addition, a number of Rainey's claims regarding the propriety of this Court's

3

sentence are not cognizable post-conviction claims and he is bound by res judicata because this

4

Court's sentence was appealed and affirmed. Finally, many of Rainey's claims are factually

5

disproved by the record. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-

6

conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is
appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho

7

518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220
8
9

10

(1990).

A.

The challenge to his sentence is not a proper basis for post-conviction relief
and there is no factual basis for any of his claims related to his sentence in any
event.

11

Like before, Rainey never filed any affidavits creating a factual issue regarding the Court's

12

sentence, including mitigating evidence or errors in the presentence investigation report. The Court

13

is not required to accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or a
petitioner's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App.

14

1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986).
15

However, claims that a sentence is unduly harsh affords no basis for post-conviction relief

16

if the sentence is othernise legal. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct.

17

App. 1992); Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 350, 796 P.2d 1023 (1990); Ferrier v. State, 115 Idaho

18

886, 771 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1989); Williams v. State, 113 Idaho 685, 747 P.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1987);

19

Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987). A post-conviction relief proceeding
under I. C. §19-4901 is designed to permit a challenge to an underlying conviction or to an illegal

20

sentence; it is not intended as a means of pursuing a collateral attack upon the manner in which the
21

trial court exercised its sentencing discretion. Id.; see Brandt, 118 Idaho at 352, 796 P.2d at 1025.

22

Moreover, the remedy provided by the post-conviction procedure act is not a substitute for an

23

appeal from a sentence or conviction. LC. § 19-4901 (b).

24
25

In addition, to the extent Rainey makes claims that the Court did not follow the plea
agreement, the record clearly establishes that the Court was not bound by the plea agreement and
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that Rainey was fully aware that the Court was not bound. There is no factual basis for this claim.
1

"If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the
2

petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State,

3

148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803

4

(2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 80 l P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990).

5
6

Finally, this Court's sentence was challenged on appeal and it was upheld. When legal
issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of

res judicata from raising them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115
7

Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 233, 766 P.2d 701,
8

703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey related to the Court's sentence, including the

9

victim's history, are barred or have no factual basis. "If the record conclusively disproves an

10

essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of

11

law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010);

12

Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v.State,118 Idaho 865,
869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990).

13

B.
14
15

Rainey does not raise any new contentions in his Successive Petition and does
not establish why the contentions were not raised in his original Petition.

On August 9, 2010, Rainey filed his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging
ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, based on his allegation that his attorney

16

failed to tell him that statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report
17

could be used against him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further

18

contended that his attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended

19

that his attorney failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after

20

being instructed to do so. He did not support any of these statements with any other affidavits or

21

evidence. Furthermore, his factual allegations were not supported by the record.
The record proved that Rainey was clearly informed by his attorney and by the Court about

22

his constitutional right to remain silent during the pre-sentence report and during his psychological
23

evaluation. He was also clearly informed before participating in either that any statements he made

24

could be used against him at sentencing. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element

25

of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary
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•

•

dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v.
1

State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d
2

1216, 1220 (1990). The record also proved that he acknowledged he had been informed.

3

Moreover, as a matter of law, he has no constitutional right to have his counsel attend any

4

evaluation, including the pre-sentence investigation. Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, _, 224 P.3d

5

515, 528-529 (Ct. App. 2009); Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2007).

6

Rainey also claimed, without evidence, that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did
not hire an expert on "somnambulism." However, after being specifically alerted to the fact that he

7

must support his claims with evidence, Rainey never supported this claim. The Court informed
8

Rainey that while this contention could properly be considered in an application for post-

9

conviction relief, Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 952 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998), in order to succeed

10

on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to procure expert

11

witnesses, he "must assertfacts that would have been discovered by additional investigation and

12

should offer expert testimony that would have been produced if the funds to hire the experts had
been requested." Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 405, 973 P.2d 749, 757 (Ct. App. 1999)

13

(quoting State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772,793,948 P.2d 127, 146 (1997)(em.phasis added)). In fact,

14

the Court informed him of this when it denied him counsel on August 17, 2010, and again in its

15

Order Conditionally Dismissing Petition issued on August 18, 2010. In his response, he simply

16

reargued his case and provided no evidence to support this claim.

17

18

In his Successive Petition he is once again raising the very same issues. He cannot use a
Successive Petition to simply reargue his earlier Petition. Moreover, to the extent that any of his
claims are slightly different, Rainey has not explained why they could not have been raised in his

19
20

21

first Petition.

C.

Claims related to the Court's decision to deny Rainey appointed counsel on his
original Post-Conviction Petition appeal are not cognizable.

Rainey complains that this Court violated his constitutional rights by denying his Motion
22

for Appointment of Counsel on Appeal in the original Petition. Rainey could have raised this issue
23

24

on appeal from the Court's denial on his original post-conviction Petition and did not. While he
complains that he was indigent, the Court takes judicial notice of the Court's order allowing for

25
26
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•

..

partial payment in the original Petition and the fact that he actually made payments consistent with
1

the Court's order.
2

When ]egal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal or could have been

3

raised on appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising them again in

4

a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 210, 766 P .2d 678, 680 (1988);

5

State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231,233, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey

related to the Court's decision to deny him counsel on appeal from the Court's order denying
6

counsel are barred or have no factual basis.
7

Therefore, based on the documents in the file, in an exercise of discretion, the Court finds

8

Rainey is not entitled to appointment of counsel at public expense in this Successive Petition

9

because, taking every inference in his favor, he failed to allege facts that raised the possibility of a

10
11

12

valid claim cognizable as a successive petition for post-conviction before this Court.
Therefore, the Court denies his Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 8th day of May 2012.
13
14

Cheri C ~ ,

15

ae

16

17

18

19
20

21
22
23
24
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I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, does hereby certify that on ~ May
1

2012 I mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the ORDER DENYING APPOINTMENT OF

2

COUNSEL as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause

3

in envelopes addressed as follows:

4
5

6
7
1

8

JOHN THOMAS RAINEY
IDOC NO 90457
ISCI l 40-9A
POBOX 14
BOISE ID 83707-0014

9

10
1

11

12

.

GREGHBOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
JEAN FISHER
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

13
14

15

16

17

Date:
18

S { 1 / 1'l----1-,
-,1-----

19
20

21
22
23
24

25
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Appendix B

NO.

3 :a.1
A.M,_ _ _Fl[.EO
_.PM.--"""""'---.t--

MAY 2 2 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By LUCILLE DANSEREAU
DEPUTY

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3

4
5

JOHN THOMAS RAINEY,

6

Petitioner,

Case No. CV-PC-2012-07699

7

vs.
8

THE ST A TE OF IDAHO,

ORDER
CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING
SUCCESSIVE PETITION

9

10

Defendant.

11

On April 26, 2012, the Petitioner, John Thomas Rainey, filed a Successive Petition for

12

Post-Conviction Relief, alleging his sentence amounted to cruel and inhuman punishment and the

13

Court disregarded the presentence investigator's sentencing recommendations. He also complains

14

that in his appeal of his last post-conviction case, the Court violated his rights by not appointing
counsel on appeal from the Court's decision denying his first post-conviction Petition. Further, he

15

again contends that his trial attorney failed to tell him that statements made during his
16

psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report could be used against him and that he had a

17

constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further contends that his attorney should have sat in

18

on both examinations with him. He also contends that his attorney failed to provide him with an

19

expert that could evaluate his "somnapi.bulism" after being instructed to do so. He claims his
attorney forced him to answer a questionnaire to please the Court and that his attorney promised

20

him a certain sentence. Like before, he did not support any of these statements with any other
21
22

affidavits or evidence. Furthermore, as discussed below, these are the same claims he made in his
original Petition - some simply repackaged.

23

In his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed on August 9, 2010, Rainey alleged

24

ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, claiming his attorney failed to tell him that

25

statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report could be used against
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him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further contended that his
1

attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended that his attorney
2

failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after being instructed

3

to do so. Like his Successive Petition, he did not support any of these statements with any other

4

affidavits or evidence. Furthermore, as the Court found in addressing this original Petition, his

5

factual allegations were not supported by the record. The Court denied him counsel at public

6

expense and ultimately entered judgment dismissing the Petition. He appealed. On appeal, the
Court denied him counsel and ultimately, the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal on June 6,

7

201 l.
8

The Court took judicial notice of the underlying record, including the guilty plea taken on

9

July 25, 2008, the sentencing held on October 8, 2008, and the LC. § 19-2522 psychological

10

evaluation. The Court also took judicial notice of the record on his prior Petition for Post-

11

Conviction Relief, Case No. CV-PC-2010-15707.

12

Once again, in this Successive Petition, contrary to his contention, the record demonstrates
that he was clearly informed by both his attorney and the Court about his constitutional right to

13

remain silent. Moreover, he acknowledged in the record he had been informed. In addition, as the

14

Court found in his first Petition, he has no right to counsel during these evaluations. Based on the

15

documents in the file, in an exercise of discretion, the Court found Rainey was not entitled to

16

appointment of counsel at public expense because, like before, taking every inference in his favor,

17

he failed to allege facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim on a Successive Petition. The
Court found that all of the claims alleged in the Successive Petition are frivolous. Therefore, the

18

Court denied his Motion for Attorney on May 7, 2012.
19

Having reviewed the Successive Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable to

20

Rainey, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Rainey is not entitled to successive post-conviction

21

relief. LC. § 19-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose

22

would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, by this order, the Court is indicating its

23

intention to dismiss Rainey's Successive Petition.
Rainey and the State may reply to the Court's notice of the proposed dismissal within 20

24

days. In light of his reply, if any, or any failure to reply, the Court may order the Successive
25
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Petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings
1

otherwise continue.
2

ANALYSIS
1

3

Successive post-conviction applications are prohibited by LC. §19-4908 "where the

4

petitioner 'knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' waived the grounds for which he now seeks

5

relief, or offers no 'sufficient reason' for the omission of those grounds in his 'original,

6

supplemental or amended petition."' Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 955, 957
(1981) (emphasis added); see also, Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794,798,992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct.

7

App. 1999). The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is designed to address
8

collateral attacks upon allegedly improper convictions and sentences, not collateral attacks upon

9

other post-conviction proceedings. See Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct.

10

App. 1987). "[T]he ultimate focus of the proceeding would remain, as it should, on whether the

11

second application has raised not merely a question of post-conviction counsel's performance but

12

substantive grounds for relief from the conviction and sentence." Wolfe, 113 Idaho at 339, 743
P.2d at 992; See Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006). A

13

successive petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed if the grounds for relief

14

were finally adjudicated or waived in the previous post-conviction proceeding. LC. § 19-4908.

15

Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441-442, 128 P.3d 975, 978-979 (Ct. App. 2006).

The Court, therefore, must determine whether the new claims were finally adjudicated in

16
17

the first proceeding or whether there was "sufficient reason" for Rainey to have omitted these
"new grounds." In addition, a number of Rainey's claims regarding the propriety of this Court's

18

sentence are not cognizable post-conviction claims and he is bound by res judicata because this
19

Court's sentence was appealed and affirmed. Finally, many of Rainey's claims are factually

20

disproved by the record. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-

21

conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is

22
23
24

25

1

J.C. § 19-4908. "All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original,
supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the
applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground
for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental,
or amended application."
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appropriate. McKay

y.

State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho

1

518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220
2
3
4

(1990).
A.

The challenge to bis sentence is not a proper basis for post-conviction relief
and there is no factual basis for any of his claims related to his sentence in any
event.

5

Like before, Rainey never filed any affidavits creating a factual issue regarding the Court's

6

sentence, including mitigating evidence or errors in the presentence investigation report. The Court

7

is not required to accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or a
petitioner's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App.

8

1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,159,715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986).
9

However, claims that a sentence is unduly harsh affords no basis for post-conviction relief

10

if the sentence is otherwise legal. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct.

11

App. 1992); Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 350, 796 P.2d 1023 (1990); Ferrier v. State, 115 Idaho

12

886, 771 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1989); Williams v. State, 113 Idaho 685, 747 P.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1987);

13

Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987). A post-conviction relief proceeding
under LC. § 19-4901 is designed to permit a challenge to an underlying conviction or to an illegal

14

sentence; it is not intended as a means of pursuing a collateral attack upon the manner in which the
15

trial court exercised its sentencing discretion. Id.; see Brandt, 118 Idaho at 352, 796 P.2d at 1025.

16

Moreover, the remedy provided by the post-conviction procedure act is not a substitute for an

17

appeal from a sentence or conviction. LC. § l 9-4901(b).

18
19

In addition, to the extent Rainey makes claims that the Court did not follow the plea
agreement, the record clearly establishes that the Court was not bound by the plea agreement and
that Rainey was fully aware that the Court was not bound. There is no factual basis for this claim.

20

"If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the
21

petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State,

22

148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803

23

(2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990).

24
25

Finally, this Court's sentence was challenged on appeal and it was upheld. When legal
issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of

26
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res judicata from raising them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115
1

Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 233, 766 P.2d 701,
2

703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey related to the Court's sentence, including the

3

victim's history, are barred or have no factual basis. "If the record conclusively disproves an

4

essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of

5

law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010);

6

Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 PJd 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,
869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990).

7

B.
8
9

10

Rainey does not raise any new contentions in his Successive Petition and does
not establish why the contentions were not raised in his original Petition.

On August 9, 2010, Rainey filed his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging
ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, based on his allegation that his attorney
failed to tell him that statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report

11

could be used against him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further

12

contended that his attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended

13

that his attorney failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after

14

being instructed to do so. He did not support any of these statements with any other affidavits or

15

evidence. Furthermore, his factual allegations were not supported by the record.
The record proved that Rainey was clearly informed by his attorney and by the Court about

16

his constitutional right to remain silent during the pre-sentence report and during his psychological
17

evaluation. He was also clearly informed before participating in either that any statements he made

18

could be used against him at sentencing. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element

19

of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary

20

dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v.

21

State. 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d
1216, 1220 (l 990). The record also proved that he acknowledged he had been informed.

22
23
24

Moreover, as a matter of law, he has no constitutional right to have his counsel attend any
evaluation, including the pre-sentence investigation. Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, _, 224 P.3d
515, 528-529 (Ct. App. 2009); Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2007).

25
26
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Rainey also claimed, without evidence, that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did
1

not hire an expert on "somnambulism." However, after being specifically alerted to the fact that he
2

must support his claims with evidence, Rainey never supported this claim. The Court informed

3

Rainey that while this contention could properly be considered in an application for post-

4

conviction relief, Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 952 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998), in order to succeed

5

on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to procure expert

6

witnesses, he "must assert facts that would have been discovered by additional investigation and
should offer expert testimony that would have been produced if the funds to hire the experts had

7

been requested." Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 405, 973 P.2d 749, 757 (Ct. App. 1999)
8

(quoting State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 793, 948 P.2d 127, 146 (l 997)(emphasis added)). In fact,

9

the Court informed him when it denied him counsel on August 17, 2010, and again in its Order

10

Conditionally Dismissing Petition issued on August 18, 20 I 0. In his response, he simply re-argued

11

his case and provided no evidence to support this claim.

12

In his Successive Petition, he is once again raising the very same issues. He cannot use a
Successive Petition to simply re-argue his earlier Petition. Moreover, to the extent that any of his

13
llJ

15
16

claims are slightly different, Rainey has not explained why they could not have been raised in his
first Petition.

C.

Claims related to the Court's decision to deny Rainey appointed counsel on his
original post-conviction Petition appeal are not cognizable.

Rainey complains that this Court violated his constitutional rights by denying his Motion
17

for Appointment of Counsel on Appeal in the original Petition. Rainey could have raised this issue

18

on appeal from the Court's denial on his original post-conviction Petition and did not. While he

19

complains that he was indigent, the Court takes judicial notice of the Court's order allowing for

20

partial payment in the original Petition and the fact that he actually made payments consistent with

21

the Court's order.
When legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal or could have been

22

raised on appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res Judicata from raising them again in
23
24

a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208,210, 766 P.2d 678,680 (1988);
State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 233, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey

25
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related to the Court's decision to deny him counsel on appeal from the Court's order denying
1

counsel are barred or have no factual basis.
2

CONCLUSION

3

As discussed above, having reviewed the Successive Petition and any evidence in a light

4

most favorable to Rainey, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Rainey is not entitled to file this

5

Successive Petition and is not entitled to post-conviction relief. I.C. §§ 19-4906(2), 19-4908. The

6

Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose would be served by any
further proceedings. Therefore, by this order, the Court is indicating its intention to dismiss

7

Rainey's Successive Petition.
8

Rainey and the State may reply to the Court's notice of the proposed dismissal within 20

9

days. In light of his reply, if any, or any failure to reply, the Court may order the Successive

10

Petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings

11

otherwise continue.

12

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 22nd day of May 2012.

13
14

Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge

15
16

17

18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25
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ti.
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, does hereby certify that on May _ _,
1

2

2012, I mailed one copy of the ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING SUCCESSIVE
PETITION as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the parties as follows:

3

4
5
6

JOHN THOMAS RAINEY
IDOC KO. 90457
I.S.C.I. 140-9A
P.O. BOX 14
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-0014

7
8
9

JEAN FISHER
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

10
11

12

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

13
14

Date:
15

ByA~

Deputy Clerk

16
17
18

19
20

21
22

23

24
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Appendix C

JUN 2 6 2012
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By LUCILLE DANSEREAU

IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTR1ert5'f
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

2
3

JOHN THOMAS RAINEY,

4

Petitioner,

5
6

Case No. CV-PC-2012-07699

ORDER DISMISSING
SUCCESSIVE PETITION

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

7

Defendant.
8

9

10

On April 26, 2012, the Petitioner, John Thomas Rainey, filed a Successive Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief, alleging his sentence amounted to cruel and inhuman punishment and the
Court disregarded the presentence investigator's sentencing recommendations. He also complains

11

that in his appeal of his last post-conviction case, the Court violated his rights by not appointing
12

counsel on appeal from the Court's decision denying his first post-conviction Petition. Further, he

13

again contends that his trial attorney failed to tell him that statements made during his

14

psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report could be used against him and that he had a

15

constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further contends that his attorney should have sat in

16

on both examinations with him. He also contends that his attorney failed to provide him with an
expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after being instructed to do so. He claims his

17

attorney forced him to answer a questionnaire to please the Court and that his attorney promised

18

him a certain sentence. Like before, he did not support any of these statements with any other

19

affidavits or evidence. Furthermore, as discussed below, these are the same claims he made in his

20

original Petition - some simply repackaged.

21

In his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed on August 9, 2010, Rainey alleged
ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, claiming his attorney failed to tell him that

22

statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report could be used against
23

him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further contended that his

24

attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended that his attorney

25

failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after being instructed
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to do so. Like his Successive Petition, he did not support any of these statements with any other
1

affidavits or evidence. Furthermore, as the Court found in addressing this original Petition, his
2

factual allegations were not supported by the record. The Court denied him counsel at public

3

expense and ultimately entered judgment dismissing the Petition. He appealed. On appeal, the

4

Court denied him counsel and ultimately, the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal on June 6,

5

2011.

6

The Court took judicial notice of the underlying record, including the guilty plea taken on
July 25, 2008, the sentencing held on October 8, 2008, and the LC. § 19-2522 psychological

7

evaluation. The Court also took judicial notice of the record on his prior Petition for Post8

Conviction Relief, Case No. CV-PC-2010-15707.

9

Once again, in this Successive Petition, contrary to his contention, the record demonstrates

10

that he was clearly informed by both his attorney and the Court about his constitutional right to

11

remain silent. Moreover, he acknowledged in the record he had been informed. In addition, as the

12

Court found in his first Petition, he has no right to counsel during these evaluations. Based on the
documents in the file, in an exercise of discretion, the Court found Rainey was not entitled to

13

appointment of counsel at public expense because, like before, taking every inference in his favor,
14

he failed to allege facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim on a Successive Petition. The

15

Court found that all of the claims alleged in the Successive Petition were frivolous, and therefore,

16

the Court denied his Motion for Attorney on May 7, 2012.

17

Having reviewed the Successive Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable to
Rainey, the Court again finds that it is satisfied that Rainey is not entitled to successive

18

post-conviction relief. LC. § 19-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material
19

fact and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, having previously

20

given twenty (20) days' notice of its intent to dismiss his Successive Petition, and having received

21

no additional information, the Court dismisses his Successive Petition.

22
23

24
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ANALYSIS
1

1

Successive post-conviction applications are prohibited by LC. § 19-4908 "where the
2

petitioner 'knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' waived the grounds for which he now seeks

3

relief, QI offers no 'sufficient reason' for the omission of those grounds in his 'original,

4

supplemental or amended petition."' Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 955, 957

5

( 1981) (emphasis added); see also, Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct.

6

App. 1999). The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is designed to address
collateral attacks upon allegedly improper convictions and sentences, not collateral attacks upon

7

other post-conviction proceedings. See Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct.
8

App. 1987). "[T]he ultimate focus of the proceeding would remain, as it should, on whether the

9

second application has raised not merely a question of post-conviction counsel's performance but

10

substantive grounds for relief from the conviction and sentence." Wolfe, 113 Idaho at 339, 743

11

P.2d at 992; See Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006). A

12

successive petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed if the grounds for relief
were finally adjudicated or waived in the previous post-conviction proceeding. LC. § 19-4908.

13

Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441-442, 128 PJd 975, 978-979 (Ct. App. 2006).

14

The Court, therefore, must detennine whether the new claims were finally adjudicated in

15

the first proceeding or whether there was "sufficient reason" for Rainey to have omitted these

16

"new grounds." In addition, a number of Rainey's claims regarding the propriety of this Court's

17

sentence are not cognizable post-conviction claims and he is bound by res judicata because this
Court's sentence was appealed and affirmed. Finally, many of Rainey's claims are factually

18

disproved by the record. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post19

20

conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is
appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho

21
22
23
24
25

1

J.C. § 19-4908. "All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original,
supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the
applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground
for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental,
or amended application."
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518,523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stua~t v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220
1

(1990).
2
3

A.

The challenge to his sentence is not a proper basis for post-conviction relief
and there is no factual basis for any of his claims related to his sentence in any
event.

4

Like before, Rainey never filed any affidavits creating a factual issue regarding the Court's

5

sentence, including mitigating evidence or errors in the presentence investigation report. The Court

6

is not required to accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or a

7

petitioner's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App.
1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986).

8

However, claims that a sentence is unduly harsh affords no basis for post-conviction relief
9

if the sentence is otherwise legal. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct.

10

App. 1992); Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 350, 796 P.2d 1023 (1990); Ferrier v. State, 115 Idaho

11

886, 771 P.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1989); Williams v. State, 113 Idaho 685, 747 P.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1987);

12

Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987). A post-conviction relief proceeding

13

under LC. § 19-4901 is designed to permit a challenge to an underlying conviction or to an illegal
sentence; it is not intended as a means of pursuing a collateral attack upon the manner in which the

14

trial court exercised its sentencing discretion. Id.; see Brandt, 118 Idaho at 3 52, 796 P .2d at 1025.
15
16

Moreover, the remedy provided by the post-conviction procedure act is not a substitute for an
appeal from a sentence or conviction. LC. §19-490l(b).

17

In addition, to the extent Rainey makes claims that the Court did not follow the plea

18

agreement, the record clearly establishes that the Court was not bound by the plea agreement and

19

that Rainey was fully aware that the Court was not bound. There is no factual basis for this claim.
"If the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the

20

petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State,
21
22

148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990).

23

Finally, this Court's sentence was challenged on appeal and it was upheld. When legal

24

issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of

25

res judicata from raising them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115
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Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 233, 766 P.2d 701,
1

703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey related to the Court's sentence, including the
2

victim's history, are barred or have no factual basis. "If the record conclusively disproves an

3

essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of

4

law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010);

5

Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,

6

869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990).
B.

7
8

9

Rainey does not raise any new contentions in his Successive Petition and does
not establish why the contentions were not raised in his original Petition.

On August 9, 2010, Rainey filed his original Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging
ineffective counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000398, based on his allegation that his attorney
failed to tell him that statements made during his psychological evaluation and pre-sentence report

10

could be used against him and that he had a constitutional right to refuse to participate. He further
11

contended that his attorney should have sat in on both examinations with him. He also contended

12

that his attorney failed to provide him with an expert that could evaluate his "somnambulism" after

13

being instructed to do so. He did not support any of these statements with any other affidavits or

14

evidence. Furthermore, his factual allegations were not supported by the record.

15

The record proved that Rainey was clearly informed by his attorney and by the Court about
his constitutional right to remain silent during the pre-sentence report and during his psychological

16

evaluation. He was also clearly informed before participating in either that any statements he made
17

could be used against him at sentencing. "If the record conclusively disproves an essential element

18

of a post-conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary

19

dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v.

20

State, 144 Idaho 518,523, 164 P.3d 798,803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d

21

1216, 1220 (1990). The record also proved that he acknowledged he had been informed.
Moreover, as a matter of law, he has no constitutional right to have his counsel attend any

22

evaluation, including the pre-sentence investigation. Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, _, 224 P.3d
23

515, 528-529 (Ct. App. 2009); Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2007).

24

Rainey also claimed, without evidence, that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did

25

not hire an expert on "somnambulism." However, after being specifically alerted to the fact that he

26
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...
must support his claims with evidence, Rainey never supported this claim. The Court informed
1

Rainey that while this contention could properly be considered in an application for post2

conviction relief, Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 952 P .2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998), in order to succeed

3

on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to procure expert

4

witnesses, he "must assert facts that would have been discovered by additional investigation and

5

should offer expert testimony that would have been produced if the funds to hire the experts had

6

been requested." Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 405, 973 P.2d 749, 757 (Ct. App. 1999)
(quoting State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 793, 948 P.2d 127, 146 (1997)(emphasis added)). In fact,

7

the Court informed him when it denied him counsel on August 17, 2010, and again in its Order
8

9

Conditionally Dismissing Petition issued on August 18, 2010. In his response, he simply reargued
his case and provided no evidence to support this claim.

10

In his Successive Petition he is once again raising the very same issues. He cannot use a

11

Successive Petition to simply reargue his earlier Petition. Moreover, to the extent that any of his

12

claims are slightly different, Rainey has not explained why they could not have been raised in his
first Petition.

13
14

15

C.

Claims related to the Court's decision to deny Rainey appointed counsel on his
original Post-Conviction Petition appeal are not cognizable.

Rainey complains that this Court violated his constitutional rights by denying his Motion
for Appointment of Counsel on Appeal in the original Petition. Rainey could have raised this issue

16

on appeal from the Court's denial on his original post-conviction Petition and did not. While he
17

complains that he was indigent, the Court takes judicial notice of the Court's order allowing for

18

partial payment in the original Petition and the fact that he actually made payments consistent with

19

the Court's order.

20
21

When legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal or could have been
raised on appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising them again in
a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 210, 766 P.2d 678, 680 (1988);

22

State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231,233, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988). Thus, all issues raised by Rainey
23
24

related to the Court's decision to deny him counsel on appeal from the Court's order denying
counsel are barred or have no factual basis.

25
26
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..
CONCLUSION
l

As discussed above, having reviewed the Successive Petition and any evidence in a light

2

most favorable to Rainey, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Rainey is not entitled to file this

3

Successive Petition and is not entitled to post-conviction relief. I.C. §§ 19-4906(2), 19-4908. The
Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose would be served by any

5
6

further proceedings. Therefore, the Court dismisses Rainey's Successive Petition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 26th day of June 2012.
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I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, does hereby certify that on o#~une
2012 I mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the ORDER DISMISSING SUCCESSIVE
2

PETITION as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause

3

in envelopes addressed as follows:

4

5
6
7
8

JOHN THOMAS RAINEY
IDOC NO. 90457
I.S.C.I. 140-9A
P.O. BOX 14
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-0014

9

10
11
12

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
JEAN FISHER
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
200 W. FRONT STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-5954

13
14
15
16

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

17
18
19

Date:

/dZ1t/;;;.,

ByA~/41/~

20

Deputy Clerk
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